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ABSTRACT 
 
 
In 2003, the Florida Supreme Court lifted the ban that prohibited sheriff deputies from engaging 
in collective bargaining.  Borrowing data from the Criminal Justice Agency Profile, an annual 
census of Florida law enforcement agencies, enables this study to entertain two questions.  First, 
what impact did the decision have on job benefits?  Second, would restricting analysis to agencies 
with 100+ sworn members alter the findings?  Fixed-effects panel data analyses reveal a 
noteworthy effect on starting salaries.  Focusing on just larger agencies leads to a dramatic 
underestimation of the decision’s impact.  The timeliness of this study is appraised in light of 
pending federal legislation. 
 
Keywords: collective bargaining; unionization; salary; job benefits; Florida 
 
-1- 
 
Introduction 
 In January of 2003, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that sheriff deputies had the 
constitutional right to engage in collective bargaining (Coastal Florida PBA, 2003).  Although 
Florida municipal police officers began unionizing in 1968 (Pynes & Corley, 2006), county sheriff 
deputies were exempted from similar coverage.  Chapter 447 (Florida Statutes, 1975) specifically 
reserved the state legislature’s right “to regulate the activities and affairs of labor unions” in 
sheriff offices (SOs).  The Coastal Florida PBA ruling reversed this line of thinking. 
 This decision prompted an immediate flurry of activity.  In the ensuing six months, labor 
organizations filed 30 petitions with the Florida Public Employees Relations Commission (PERC) 
to represent sheriff employees in 18 counties (Cohee, 2003).  Over the next three years, elections 
to choose a bargaining agent were held in 13 sheriff agencies.  Unions prevailed in ten contests 
and absorbed almost 7,000 potential members (Pynes & Corley, 2006).  Twenty-eight agencies 
had a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) in place by the end of 2008.  These organizations 
housed 15,581 sworn personnel or 76% of all sheriff deputies in the state (Florida Department of 
Law Enforcement, 2009). 
 This series of events provides an opportunity to investigate the impact of unionization 
upon salaries and job benefits in Florida sheriff departments.  Before going further, it would be 
helpful to visit the decision in greater detail. 
Florida Case Law 
The issue of whether Florida deputy sheriffs could unionize arose in Murphy v. Mack 
(1978).  The key question was whether deputies were “appointees” or “employees.”  Although the 
Florida Supreme Court held they were public employees, it noted that the legislature went to great 
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lengths to retain final authorization and to exclude sheriff deputies from collective bargaining 
(Dietzen, 2000). 
 The court reiterated its position when the same issue materialized the following year.  As 
public employees, deputy sheriffs were barred legislatively from engaging in collective bargaining 
(Ison v. Zimmerman, 1979).  The distinction between “appointee” and “employee” gradually 
spread to situations involving other state constitutional officers.  Eventually, the Florida Supreme 
Court would retreat from its Murphy dogma. 
 Service Employees (2000) challenged Murphy by asking whether deputy court clerks were 
public employees under Florida law.  The plaintiff, a staff member of the Clerk of the Circuit 
Court in Orange County, contended her union activism led to her job termination.  The Florida 
PERC dismissed the allegation of an unfair labor practice under the Murphy logic.  The Florida 
Supreme Court, though, ruled on behalf of the ousted employee, which paved the way to 
extending collective bargaining rights to sheriff deputies.  The justices noted that Article I, 
Section 6 of the Florida Constitution guarantees private and public employees the right to 
collective bargaining.  It reads: 
The right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on account of 
membership or non-membership in any labor union or labor organization.  The 
right of employees, by and through a labor organization, to bargain collectively 
shall not be denied or abridged. 
 In tracing legislative intent over the years, the court found ample provisions supporting 
this constitutional right.  More significantly, the justices drew a bright line between “managerial” 
and “ordinary” employees.  They held that managers were not public employees for collective 
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bargaining purposes and that only ordinary employees could unionize.  Under common law, the 
position of deputy officer was a mere extension or appendage of the appointing constitutional 
officer.  With the passage of time, however, the distinction between being “appointed” versus 
“employed” has become lost. 
 This change of direction did not go unnoticed.  Less than a month after Service Employees 
was decided, a local law enforcement union filed a petition with PERC to represent Brevard 
County deputies (Ruby, 2003).  Given the contradiction between Murphy and Service Employees, 
the Florida Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
 The first judicial act was to rephrase the question posed in Coastal Florida PBA (2003).  
Instead of determining whether deputy sheriffs were excluded statutorily from collective 
bargaining, the court investigated whether the state constitution banned such activity.  The court 
emphasized two important points.  First, sheriff deputies performed the same work as municipal 
police officers who possessed collective bargaining rights.  Second, the legislature already 
allowed deputy sheriffs in some counties to unionize.  In the end, the court ruled there was no 
compelling governmental interest to be gained or preserved by depriving some sheriff deputies of 
the constitutional right to engage in collective bargaining.  As a result, the Florida Supreme Court 
ruling on January 30, 2003 extended the right to collectively bargain to all sheriff deputies. 
 This institutional change prompted the current study.  While an additional question will be 
articulated later, one query surfaces at this point.  That is, did the 2003 Coastal ruling impact 
entry-level salaries and other job benefits for sheriff deputies? 
Literature Review 
 Critics characterize the existing law enforcement collective bargaining literature as terribly 
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outdated, silent on key issues, and constrained by methodological shortcomings.  For example, 
Wilson and his colleagues (2006, p. 23) complained “one of the key limitations in this literature is 
the lack of recent analysis using data collected after the 1980s.”  A decade earlier, Zhao and 
Lovrich (1997, p. 510) lamented “there is an absolute dearth of empirical assessment on the effect 
of collective bargaining on supplemental compensation levels,” a refrain Briggs et al. (2008, p. 
229) echoed.  Furthermore, studies rely upon cross-sectional data from a single point in time 
(Briggs et al., 2008, p. 232; Wilson et al., 2006, p. 21).  In short, there is room for improvement. 
 Wilson et al. (2006) used the Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics 
(LEMAS) data from 1990, 1993, 1997, and 2000 to explore the impact of unionization on starting 
salaries in 352 municipal police departments.  While collective bargaining was responsible for 
higher entry-level salaries, the economic environment (city budget, per capita income, and 
unemployment) also contributed to pay differentials.  Similarly, Zhao and Lovrich (1997), along 
with Briggs et al. (2008), concentrated on salary supplements (hazardous duty assignments, 
differential shift pay, education incentives, and merit pay).  They, too, analyzed LEMAS data and 
found that unionization was a significant determinant of these job benefits in large municipal 
agencies.  Although these three studies combined time-series with cross-sectional data, they 
simply measured the presence or absence of a collective bargaining agent without examining the 
impact of unions that have operated continuously for long periods. 
 The findings from these three studies (Briggs et al., 2008; Wilson et al., 2006; Zhao & 
Lovrich, 1997) are congruent with past literature (Delaney, Feuille, & Hendricks, 1984; Feuille & 
Delaney, 1986; Geley & Chandler, 1995; Hall & Vanderporten, 1977; Ichnioski, Freeman, & 
Lauer, 1989; O’Brien, 1992; O’Brien, 1994).  Thus, it would appear that collective bargaining in 
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contemporary law enforcement is associated with salary gains and increased job benefits. 
Methods 
 
Data Source 
 In 1997, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) began conducting an annual 
census of all law enforcement agencies in the state called the Criminal Justice Agency Profile 
(CJAP).  CJAP resembles the national LEMAS inquiry, administered periodically by the federal 
Department of Justice (Reaves & Hickman, 2004).  Like LEMAS, CJAP procures information 
about entry-level personnel, employee benefits, pay standards, agency characteristics, officer 
demographics, and other organizational features. 
 Despite similarities, CJAP differs from LEMAS in at least three critical ways.  First, CJAP 
is restricted to just Florida law enforcement agencies.  Since the Coastal (2003) ruling extends 
only to Florida SOs, CJAP is a more appropriate database.  Second, CJAP surveys all SOs, 
regardless of size.  In contrast, LEMAS covers all agencies larger than 100 sworn full-time 
members and relies on stratified sampling to select smaller agencies.1  Third, CJAP gathers data 
annually, whereas LEMAS appears every three or four years.  This yearly collection enables CJAP 
to capture operational changes almost immediately after they occur.  At the time of this study, the 
2003 LEMAS was the most recent data set.  Given that the Coastal decision was announced in 
early 2003, reliance upon LEMAS would preclude a full understanding of the case’s impact. 
 Past research has restricted LEMAS analyses to large agencies.  As a result, the present 
study is uniquely positioned to probe an issue the literature has yet to entertain.  That is, do the 
original CJAP findings remain intact after eliminating smaller agencies? 
Study Group 
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 Each of the 67 Florida counties has a SO.  Prior to Coastal, deputies could unionize only if 
the Florida legislature extended a special privilege.  There were six unionized SOs in 2000 and 
three more counties joined the fold in 2001.2  These nine agencies were eliminated because they 
were immune from the Coastal decision.  The remaining 58 SOs span a six-year period (2003–
2008) and yield a total of 348 possible observations in the panel analysis.3  Missing data will be 
mentioned where appropriate. 
Dependent Variables 
Five indicators (entry-level salary, annual leave, salary supplements, buy-back provisions, 
and a tuition reimbursement plan) are used to determine whether unionization impacted the job 
benefits package that Florida sheriff deputies receive. 
 The CJAP survey asks administrators to report the base pay for first-year deputies.  These 
figures do not include bonuses, overtime pay, employer retirement contributions, medical/dental 
subsidies, take-home cars, disability insurance coverage, life insurance premiums, or the like.4 
 Unions also negotiate paid holidays, personal days, annual vacation time, and sick hours.  
Some of these items are arranged on different metrics.  For example, holidays and personal leave 
are recorded in days, but sick and vacation time appear in hours.  Converting hours into days is 
complicated by changes in the standard shift.  In 2000, 34% of the SOs adhered to an eight-hour 
shift and 49% utilized a twelve-hour schedule.  By 2008, only 13% retained an eight-hour shift 
and 78% operated on a twelve-hour day.  In addition, there were 70 missing data points for 
vacation hours and 34 for sick hours.  As a result, annual leave is simply the aggregate count of 
personal days and paid holidays. 
 The current study merges shift differential and longevity pay into a single binary indicator 
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to reflect salary supplements.  Having shift differential pay means that deputies are paid more to 
work undesirable hours, such as the midnight shift or weekends.  Longevity pay indicates whether 
employees receive increments or bumps in salary depending upon their accumulated experience or 
years of service.5 
 A buy-back program allows employees the flexibility to cash in unused leave or trade 
those hours for annual leave or personal holidays.6  The variable was coded as the number of 
reported whole hours of buy-back. 
 Finally, some agencies provide financial assistance to degree-seeking deputies enrolled in 
college courses.7  Sheriffs who help underwrite educational costs are enabling deputies to earn 
extra pay and retirement benefits derived from state, not local, funds.  While the exact nature of 
these tuition reimbursement plans may vary from partial to full support and may depend upon the 
recipient’s classroom performance, any employer support was coded as a value of one.8 
 Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for the five dependent variables.  The average salary 
during the post-Coastal period was $5,299 higher than the 2000–02 earnings.  Annual leave 
increased by .4 of a day over the same time frames.  SOs with salary supplements inched up from 
32% to 38%, buy-back provisions moved from 44% of 46% of the agencies, and tuition 
reimbursement programs changed from 51% to 55%. 
―TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE― 
Independent Variables 
 Variables representing agency traits and county economic conditions were gathered to help 
gauge differences between unionized and non-unionized SOs.  Agency characteristics included 
union status, how many years the union had represented sheriff deputies, sworn size, and fiscal 
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expenditures.  The county median household income and unemployment rate reflected economic 
conditions.  The next several paragraphs describe these variables in greater detail. 
 CJAP records whether sheriff deputies are governed by a CBA.  These data displayed a 
minimal amount of missing points and omitted values were easily rectified through an 
independent source.  Santa Rose County had a history of union representation, but its series was 
interrupted by a single year indicating the absence of a labor organization.  Columbia County had 
a long record of non-union status marred by a report of active union status.  These discrepancies 
were reconciled through PERC, the state agency tasked with monitoring bargaining units, 
certifying union election outcomes, and handling unfair labor practice disputes.  A check of PERC 
files revealed that neither agency had a change in collective bargaining status.  One other county 
surfaced with an anomaly.  Polk County SO decertified its bargaining agent in 2008 by a majority 
vote of the members. 
 A more probing agency consideration was the creation of a duration variable that tallied 
the number of years a CBA has been in place.  As Ichniowksi et al. (1989) noted, the effects of 
collective bargaining on law enforcement compensation depend upon state bargaining laws.  Since 
the current sample hails from just Florida, it avoids interstate comparative difficulties.  However, 
the present study adds a new wrinkle by recognizing that not all labor union gains are immediate.  
Past studies have relied upon a simple dichotomous measure to reflect whether a CBA was in 
place.  Such an approach overlooks union growth and experience.  This study hypothesizes that 
newly formed unions tend to focus on salary issues initially.  Once these concerns are remedied, 
attention turns to other job benefits.  Thus, while unionization impacts salary levels very quickly, 
the effects on other job benefits are not immediate.  One way to capture this influence is to go 
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beyond a presence-or-absence indicator and include the number of years a CBA has been in effect.  
This strategy will enable the current study to highlight a delayed relationship, if one exists. 
 Previous research, based upon large municipal police agencies that responded to the 
LEMAS inventory, has uncovered other variables connected to employment compensation.  The 
number of sworn personnel sometimes emerges as a weak determinant of salary and benefits 
(Briggs et al., 2008; Wilson et al., 2006; Zhao & Lovrich, 1997).  LEMAS consists of a two-prong 
data collection effort.  The first part surveys all agencies containing at least 100 sworn personnel.  
The second portion relies upon a stratified sample of agencies with less than 100 sworn.  In 
contrast, CJAP contains a complete enumeration of all Florida agencies, regardless of size. 
 The original plan was to include a measure of fiscal capacity, similar to previous studies 
(Briggs et al., 2008; Wilson et al., 2006; Zhao & Lovrich, 1997).  Earlier projects examined 
agencies with 100+ sworn members and defined fiscal capacity as agency expenditures per capita.  
An effort was made to capture similar data for Florida SOs.  The Legislative Committee on 
Intergovernmental Relations (LCIR), housed within the Florida Department of Financial Services, 
routinely compiles this information from annual county reports.  However, inspection of the data 
revealed wild fluctuations for no apparent reason.9  These instances, along with other extreme 
valuations, rendered the data suspect.  Discussions with LCIR personnel could not allay these 
worries.  As a result, these flawed budgetary data were eliminated from further consideration. 
 Two economic controls were selected.  Median household income was used to assess the 
general economic environment.  The U.S. Census Bureau (2009) publishes yearly county 
estimates in its Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates series.  Another economic indicator, the 
county unemployment rate, was obtained from the Florida Statistical Abstract, an annual 
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compilation by the Bureau of Economic and Business Research at the University of Florida. 
 Summary statistics for the independent variables appear in Table 2.  The post-Coastal 
years saw 27% of the SOs unionize, with the typical agent being in place for almost a year (0.82).  
The SOs grew in size and the median income rose to $39,479 per household.  The unemployment 
rate dipped from 4.9 to 4.5 over the series. 
—TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE— 
The Model 
 The expectation is that unionized SOs will have, on average, higher salaries and increased 
fringe benefits.  A panel or longitudinal model could conceptualize these claims as: 
 Benefitct = αct + β1*Unionct + β2*Controlsct + Cc + Tt + εct 
where subscript c refers to the SO and the subscript t indexes the year.  Union represents the 
presence or absence of collective bargaining representation.  Controls is a vector of several 
variables that accounts for the number of certified deputies, median household income, and the 
unemployment rate.  The fixed-effects term, C, controls for heterogeneity between counties.  The 
variable T is a time trend that absorbs constant marginal change across years. 
 An event study should analyze dependent variables in terms of level and growth.  Since 
LEMAS has three to four years elapsing between observations, the prior literature is limited to 
commenting on level or intercept shifts that stem from unionization.  The ability to measure the 
growth rate or first derivative is lost with the multi-year gaps.  Using a full panel, the present 
study overcomes that hurdle by incorporating changes over time and rewriting the equation as: 
Benefitct = αct + β1*Unionct + β2*Unionct*Yearst + β3*Controlsct + Cc + Tt + εct 
The coefficient representing the interaction of Union with Year will indicate whether salary and 
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other job benefits change immediately or are delayed based on the number of years unionized. 
Results 
 Table 3 displays the annual entry-level salary, according to union status, for the 58 SOs 
affected by the Coastal decision.  While the 2003 salary difference between unionized and non-
unionized sheriff offices is not statistically important, there is a significant salary gap for all the 
ensuing years.  By 2008, unionized deputies are paid $4,989 more a year than their non-unionized 
counterparts.  To place these salary differentials into perspective, assume that a new recruit joins 
an average-paying SO in 2003 and earns the average starting salary every year thereafter.  If this 
hypothetical deputy works in a unionized agency, then he or she would accumulate an extra 
$24,274 over the six-year period.  Of course, it remains to be seen whether variables other than 
union representation are impinging upon the income figures. 
―TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE― 
 The right-hand portion of Table 3 enables one to compare starting salaries in unionized 
and non-unionized SOs that employ 100+ sworn deputies.  None of those paycheck differentials 
attain significance.  Even so, a hypothetical rookie working in the typical larger unionized SO 
would have earned $8,117 more than his or her non-unionized counterpart during this period. 
 Table 4 summarizes the fixed-effects panel data analyses predicting starting salary and 
benefits for all 58 SOs affected by the 2003 Coastal decision.  The first equation for each 
dependent variable contains the intercept shift driven by unionization, the exact same approach 
taken by previous studies.  The second equation introduces an interaction term that tests whether 
the slope changes in the series according to how many years a union has been operating. 
―TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE― 
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 Three variables (sworn size, unemployment rate, and union status) are significant 
predictors of annual salary.  Starting pay goes up as agencies become larger, as the unemployment 
rate drops, and for unionized SOs.  When SO size is one standard deviation larger than the mean 
number of sworn personnel, a wage premium of $2,169 is added to entry-level salary.  Similarly, a 
1% decrease in the unemployment rate produces a $273 increment.  Unionization causes salary 
levels to shift upward.  The presence of a union hikes salaries by $845 for entering personnel. 
 Two significant predictors emerge in Equation 2, the unemployment rate and the newly 
introduced interaction term that combines union presence with tenure.  The significant interaction 
term suggests that the approach used in previous studies might be slightly misleading.  Mature 
bargaining units secure raises faster than SOs with newly minted unions, as well as non-unionized 
agencies.  Annual salaries increase by $343 (1.2% of the mean in 2003) with each additional year 
of union status.  The 74% variation explained is on par with the Wilson et al. (2006) findings. 
 Turning to post-estimation analysis, a Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test rejects 
a random-effects model because of significant variation in the county random-error components.  
A random-effects approach imposes zero correlation between the independent variables and the 
counties they describe.  In other words, any pertinent variable affecting a county must be well 
specified.  A fixed-effects approach is useful for capturing unobserved variations in each county 
by relaxing that last assumption to allow correlation and eliminate deviations within the counties.  
A time plot (not shown here) warns that annual shocks are likely present because entry-level 
salaries rise each year for both unionized and non-unionized agencies.  Without including the 
significant year trend factor, residual shocks would have driven up estimated wage coefficients 
across counties and prevented the error term from representing white noise. 
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 The remaining panels in Table 4 examine job benefits.  Union presence only alters the 
salary supplement and buy-back provisions.  Interestingly, this finding would not have emerged 
had the present study relied upon the same strategy that previous studies have selected.  While 
there is no impact derived from unionization, the slope shifts are statistically significant for salary 
supplements and buy-back provisions.  The likelihood of securing salary supplements increases by 
61.3% for each additional year a union bargains on behalf of deputies during the post-Coastal era.  
For buy-back provisions, the estimation results are reversed with the intercept now being positive 
and the interaction term having a negative coefficient.  A negative slope occurs because 
bargaining units immediately obtain buy-back provisions and there are no further changes.  If 
initial negotiations do not procure this job condition, future agreements have even less success. 
 The declining sample sizes indicate a lack of variation among agencies.  For example, 
there are 348 data points when the focus is on annual leave, but only 42 observations for tuition 
reimbursement.  If an agency does not provide educational assistance in 2003, it continues not to 
do so over the years.  While the fixed-effects approach works well when analyzing salaries, the 
estimations for tuition reimbursement are inconclusive.  In short, it appears that post-Coastal 
CBAs elevate entry-level salaries, but have a spotty influence on other job aspects. 
 Table 5 confines analysis of entry-level salary and job benefits to SOs with at least 100 
members.  While the unemployment rate is a significant predictor of annual pay, union status is 
not.  This solution would make it seem as if collective bargaining is unsuccessful at eliciting 
better salaries in the larger SOs.  However, the picture changes when an interaction term is 
introduced.  The second equation shows that unionization does have a significant impact on salary 
levels.   Unionized agencies enjoy estimated marginal salary gains around $408, an annual bonus 
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of 1.3%, every year after the Coastal decision.  If the estimation relies on dummy variables for the 
years unionized (not shown here) instead of interacting union status with tenure, then a CBA 
would not return a statistically significant influence on salary growth rates until the fifth or sixth 
year.  A considerable passage of time might be needed before a CBA sways starting salaries. 
―TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE― 
 None of the other job benefits, with the exception of buy-back provisions, fare any better 
with collective bargaining.  Union presence shows a consistent lack of influence upon annual 
leave, salary supplements, and tuition repayment in the larger agencies because these job benefits 
exhibit no variation over time.  This lack of impact is a bit surprising because larger Coastal-
affected agencies are more likely to unionize (41% for 100+ SOs versus 27% for all Coastal-
affected agencies).  Nonetheless, the bigger SOs report a smaller premium for average salaries of 
unionized and non-unionized departments (a 6.2% gap compared to a 16.0% change by 2008).  
Perhaps, unions serve some other purpose beyond reforming the selected job benefits. 
Discussion 
Two focal concerns frame the current study.  The first issue is whether the Florida 
Supreme Court Coastal decision impacted entry-level salaries and other job benefits for deputy 
sheriffs.  Past studies have found that unionization increased salaries (Wilson et al., 2006) and 
improved supplementary packages (Briggs et al., 2008; Zhao & Lovrich, 1997).  The current 
analysis reveals that unionization in Florida SOs raised starting salaries immediately and 
decisively, but did not alter other job benefits over the course of the study period. 
 The second matter this paper probes is whether restricting the study group to agencies that 
employ 100+ sworn members, a common cut-off point in the literature, yields comparable results.  
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Until recently, LEMAS was the sole purveyor of any systematic effort to describe local law 
enforcement agencies and their operations.  Researchers had no alternative data sources at their 
immediate disposal.  As a result, analysts had to be content with the fact that LEMAS completely 
enumerated larger agencies, but only sampled smaller ones.  The advent of CJAP, however, 
allows an empirical determination as to whether this size restriction produces skewed results. 
 Initial salary comparisons show that unions are responsible for higher starting salaries 
when examining all CJAP entrants, but not when the focus is restricted to just the larger SOs.  The 
salary contrast between all CJAP agencies and the bigger SOs is substantial.  Using the entire 
CJAP database, the hypothetical deputy sheriff working under a CBA would accumulate $24,274 
more in earnings than his or her non-unionized counterpart.  That difference drops to $8,118 when 
examining just the larger SOs.  While union salaries might not be significantly higher in bigger 
agencies on an annual basis, the cumulative effect of a higher earning power is noticeable. 
 The results drawn from the multivariate examination of salaries and job benefits depend 
upon the analytical strategy chosen.  If this paper had followed the previous literature and focused 
on solely the larger SOs, collective bargaining would not have registered a significant impact on 
entry-level salaries.  Furthermore, restricting union status to a simple dummy variable leaves the 
impression that a CBA exerts an instantaneous shift in benefit levels.  The current inclusion of an 
interaction term highlights the need to measure a growing or fading marginal effect gained from 
union tenure.  Without this interaction term, the 100+ group makes it look like unions have no 
material impact on any form of compensation.  However, for both the CJAP and bigger SOs, 
collective bargaining registers a change in growth rates on entry-level salary and at least one other 
benefit.  Although other benefits remain relatively unchanged over the 2000–08 interval, unions 
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swiftly secure better buy-back provisions.  Overall, a study restricted to larger agencies would 
have risked overstating the limited results and would have missed out on the possibility that salary 
supplements improve with prolonged union presence.  With these comments in mind, it might be 
prudent for future researchers to be mindful of this effect when analyzing just larger agencies. 
Limitations 
 Several other aspects deserve attention before embracing these findings as definitive.  First 
is the assumption that all unions are interchangeable.  Experience indicates they are not.  For 
instance, Polk County deputies grew disenchanted with their fledgling union, voted to oust the 
bargaining agent, and declined further union advocation.  According to PERC, the Fraternal Order 
of Police and the Police Benevolent Association are the most common labor representatives.  Both 
groups have a network of state chapters and a national headquarters.  Whether one entity is a 
better organizer or wields greater negotiating strength at the bargaining table remains unknown. 
 Second, this paper does not track union activities.  Unions can endorse candidates who are 
running for local offices, make campaign contributions, and mobilize volunteers for numerous 
tasks.  The influence of these activities is not assessed in this study. 
 Third, Florida is a “right-to-work” state.  Even though Coastal authorizes collective 
bargaining, deputy sheriffs cannot be required to join the union as a condition of gaining or 
continuing employment.  Because Florida unions negotiate on behalf of all in-unit members, they 
provide representation for both dues-paying members and “free riders.”10  Many labor groups 
regard their directories as proprietary information and do not disclose membership statistics.  As a 
result, a simple dichotomous indicator regarding union status might not be sensitive to the degree 
of representation or the strength of a labor group in an agency. 
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 Fourth, it is assumed that all CBAs are equivalent.  Even though Carter and Sapp (1992) 
show that considerable variation exists in contract clauses, no effort was expended to compare and 
contrast CBA contents.  For example, a multi-year wage agreement carved out prior to the current 
recession might contain much more lucrative terms than pay raises negotiated during a more 
austere climate, especially one characterized by high unemployment rates and declining budgets. 
 A fifth consideration is that a local cost-of-living adjustment is not an easy task to 
undertake.  The Bureau of Economic and Business Research (2009) contains several inflationary 
measures of the Consumer Price Index.  Many of these calibrations portray Florida county annual 
inflation rates as falling within the 0–1% range.  In contrast, national figures from the U.S. 
Department of Labor (2009) suggest slightly higher rates in the neighborhood of a 2–3% climb.  
While the Bureau of Economic and Business Research (2009) constructs an index for essential 
public workers like Florida teachers, it does not calculate similar wage indices for county law 
enforcement personnel.  An index to overcome these limitations would be helpful. 
 Sixth, the present study overlooks one of the most significant union protections, a 
standardized grievance procedure and the addition of Weingarten rights (National Labor 
Relations Board v. Weingarten, 1975).11  It is true that the state “Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill 
of Rights” (Florida Statutes 2009, Chapter 112.532), along with the Garrity Rule (Garrity et al. v. 
New Jersey, 1966), already guarantee certain procedural safeguards to law enforcement officers 
under criminal investigation.  However, CBAs can afford an additional layer of protection against 
overzealous and unfair management practices when it comes to disciplinary actions.12 
   Seventh, the supplemental job benefits analyzed in this paper are limited to annual leave 
amounts, salary supplements, buy-back provisions, and tuition reimbursement.  Other perks (take-
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home vehicles, clothing/cleaning allowances, wellness program subsidies, cell phones) have gone 
unnoticed, both in the present study and in the past literature. 
 Another consideration lies with the effort to integrate the CJAP and LEMAS instruments.  
While the two systems may appear similar, they differ in how they acquire responses about 
collective bargaining.  LEMAS asks, “Is collective bargaining authorized for your agency’s 
employees?”  The instructions are to check either a “yes” or a “no” box for sworn personnel and 
again for non-sworn personnel.  This approach could invite distortion.  For example, prior to 
Coastal, only the nine counties that had won legislative approval could respond affirmatively.  
After the Coastal decision, all 67 SOs could indicate “yes” because the Florida Supreme Court 
struck down pre-existing barriers and now authorized collective bargaining for all sheriff deputies.  
Being eligible to unionize does not necessarily imply that an agency actually traversed the steps 
necessary to install a union.  In contrast, the CJAP is more direct with its query, “Does your 
agency belong to a collective bargaining unit (PBA, FOP, etc.) for sworn personnel?” 
 Eighth, another difference associated with the LEMAS approach stems from the interval 
between successive administrations of the survey.  Past studies use LEMAS data covering the 
years 1990, 1993, 1997, and 2000.  The gaps between the survey years could introduce 
imprecision.  For example, members may have moved to disband their collective bargaining unit, 
observed the mandatory one-year grace period required by the Florida PERC, and then voted in a 
new union.  Without continuously tracking union activity annually, LEMAS would overlook this 
internal turmoil and mischaracterize union presence as uninterrupted over this entangled period. 
 Ninth, the purpose of this study was to analyze the impact of the Coastal decision, not 
unionization per se.  The Florida Legislature had granted permission to nine SOs to unionize prior 
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to Coastal and, as a result, they were eliminated from the study group.  Had these counties been 
included, seven would have joined the 100+ sworn member group.13 
 Finally, there is a need to consider short-term versus long-term effects.  The present study 
uncovered a delayed effect with the interaction term.  There appears to be a five- or six-year 
lagged impact on starting salaries.  Whether it takes longer for spin-off benefits to materialize 
remains undetermined.  It may very well be that certain benefits emerge only after collective 
bargaining agent has accrued sufficient time to establish an effective stronghold. 
Conclusion 
 This study addresses the issue of what happened to entry-level salaries and other job 
benefits once Florida deputy sheriffs won the right to unionize.  This topic is extremely timely, 
especially when viewed against the backdrop of ongoing federal congressional activity.  Sponsors 
have renewed efforts to make collective bargaining a national priority by introducing a bill titled 
“The Public Safety Employer-Employee Cooperation Act of 2009” for consideration in the 111th 
Congress.  The House version (H.R. 413) debuted in January of 2009; the Senate companion (S. 
1611) was unveiled in August of 2009.  This legislative initiative grants the right to engage in 
collective bargaining to public safety employees, which includes law enforcement officers.  An 
earlier version passed the House on July 17, 2007 by a vote of 314–97, only to languish in the 
Senate chambers.  The National Sheriffs’ Association (Webre, 2008) and the International 
Association of Chiefs of Police (2008) have expressed their opposition to this legislation, while 
the National Association of Police Organizations (2009) and the Fraternal Order of Police (2009) 
have thrown their weight behind these proposals.  Obviously, Florida does not stand alone in its 
historical opposition to collective bargaining.  Should proponents rally and gain passage of the 
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pending federal legislation, the current study may offer insight as to what lies ahead. 
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Notes 
1.  The 2003 CJAP reveals that 57% (n = 33) of the SOs affected by Coastal contained fewer than 
100 deputies.  The stratified sampling strategy employed by the 2003 LEMAS enlisted 17% (n = 
7) of the Florida SOs with less than 100 sworn personnel.  Thus, if the current study relied upon 
LEMAS as the database, it would eliminate over three-fourths of the smaller SOs that the Coastal  
ruling could impact and the resulting sample size would be too small to conduct any sophisticated 
statistical analysis.  Also, reliance upon LEMAS over several points in time would render the 
current study cross-sectional rather than longitudinal because LEMAS samples the smaller SOs. 
 
2.  The state legislature allowed Broward, Charlotte, Escambia, Jacksonville, Miami-Dade, and 
Volusia SOs to unionize in 2000.  Flagler, Monroe, and Nassau SOs gained permission in 2001. 
 
3.  The total number of observations represents the 58 SOs multiplied by the number of years (6). 
 
4.  Ten of the 522 salary data points displayed missing values.  Each SO with a missing value had 
recorded a starting salary for the previous and the subsequent years so the mid-point value was 
substituted to alleviate this problem.  Five interpolated values occurred in 2003, the year of the 
Coastal ruling.  However, it would appear that any interference caused by these missing values 
would be minimal in light of how long it typically takes management and labor to reach a CBA.  
The procedure in Florida for instituting union representation involves canvassing employees for 
their signatures to demonstrate a sufficient interest in organizing, presenting a petition for 
representation to PERC, PERC reaching a determination as to which employees are eligible for 
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inclusion in the unit, arranging for and holding an election, and certifying the election results.  
Negotiations between management and workers can begin only after this three-to-five-month 
process is completed.  Once both sides have come to terms, a formal contract ratification vote 
must take place before the CBA becomes binding.  If management and labor are unable to agree 
on a contract, an impasse is declared and the matter is referred to a mediator and, if necessary, to a 
special master for binding arbitration (Florida PERC, 2004).  In light of all these steps and the 
time they consume, it is highly unlikely that efforts to engage in collective bargaining impinged 
upon the 2003 salary. 
 
5.  Thirteen SOs had missing data regarding shift differential pay.  Nine displayed the same 
information for at least three years prior to and three years after the missing data point.  Four SOs 
registered the same values for five years prior to the missing data point and for two years 
afterwards.  Longevity pay exhibited almost the exact same pattern.  Given this consistency, 
missing values were converted so as to represent the observed pattern in the ongoing series. 
 
6.  Sixteen SOs presented missing data points, with most showing a disruption in an ongoing 
series of consistent values.  Hence, substitutions were introduced to allow the continuation of 
these patterns 
 
7.  Florida sponsors a salary incentive program whereby the state augments the monthly salary of 
sworn personnel who have earned a two-year and/or a four-year college degree (Florida Statutes 
2009, Chapter 943.22). 
-23- 
 
 
8.  Perusal of the data revealed 17 data points were missing.  Nearly all these instances involved a 
sequence of consistent values in which one entry was missing.  These values were changed to 
produce a uniform series of observations. 
 
9.  For example, the Alachua County figures showed the per capita expenditure to be $1.03 in 
2000, but then dropping to 34 cents in 2001 only to soar to almost $105 in 2002.  Similarly, 
Okaloosa County vacillated from an expenditure of $0.46 in 2000 to over $91 the following year. 
 
10.  “Free riders” are workers who enjoy CBA benefits even though they do not pay union dues. 
 
11.  Weingarten protections include the right to have a union representative present during 
internal affairs interviews. 
 
12.  For example, the Florida PERC recently rescinded a five-day suspension levied against a 
deputy, who also served as a union official, after the Sheriff deemed comments the deputy wrote 
in a union newsletter were derogatory (Dickey v. Gee, 2009).  Instances like this illustrate how 
unions can operate as a check-and-balance against unfair labor practices. 
 
13.  The 2000 CJAP reported the following sworn sizes for the eliminated SOs: Broward (1,064), 
Charlotte (178), Dade (3,020), Duval (1,515), Escambia (344), Flagler (61), Monroe (168), 
Nassau (53), and Volusia (378). 
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TABLE 1 
 
Descriptive Statistics, Dependent Variables (n = 58) 
 
 
 
 
 
Salary 
 
# Annual 
Leave Days 
 
Salary 
Supplement 
 
 
Buy-Back 
 
Tuition 
Reimbursement 
        
Year M SD M SD M M M 
        
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
$23,956 
$25,064 
$26,262 
$27,405 
$3,486 
$3,695 
$4,139 
$4,275 
10.3 
10.7 
10.0 
10.4 
4.59 
4.65 
3.21 
3.22 
0.34 
0.29 
0.31 
0.33 
0.43 
0.48 
4.41 
0.40 
0.47 
0.55 
0.52 
0.50 
2004 $28,251 $4,670 11.0 4.27 0.34 0.45 0.53 
2005 $29,862 $4,529 10.3 3.30 0.41 0.41 0.57 
2006 $31,491 $4,946 10.5 3.24 0.41 0.45 0.57 
2007 $32,455 $5,275 10.6 3.05 0.34 0.53 0.57 
2008 $32,895 $5,234 11.1 4.36 0.41 0.53 0.55 
 
2000–02 
2003–08 
 
2000–08 
 
 
$25,094 
$30,393 
 
$28,627 
 
 
$3,773 
$5,226 
 
$5,425 
 
 
10.3 
10.7 
 
10.5 
 
 
4.15 
3.60 
 
3.80 
 
 
0.32 
0.38 
 
0.36 
 
 
0.44 
0.46 
 
0.46 
 
 
0.51 
0.55 
 
0.54 
 
 
Note:  Salary is not adjusted for inflation.  A code of 1 for salary supplement, buy-back, and 
tuition reimbursement indicates the presence of that attribute, while a code of zero indicates 
absence. 
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TABLE 2 
 
Descriptive Statistics, Independent Variables (n = 58) 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
Union 
 
Years 
Unionized 
 
 
Sworn Size 
Median 
Household 
Income 
 
 
Unemployment 
      
Year % M SD M SD M SD M SD 
          
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.16 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.16 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.37 
170 
174 
178 
182 
249 
254 
262 
265 
$34,795 
$33,954 
$34,168 
$35,066 
$6,400 
$6,507 
$6,685 
$6,788 
4.1 
4.9 
5.7 
5.1 
0.87 
0.93 
0.91 
0.91 
2004 0.21 0.36 0.74 185 265 $36,597 $7,030 4.5 0.93 
2005 0.24 0.60 1.14 188 270 $38,663 $7,080 3.7 0.74 
2006 0.33 0.93 1.53 193 272 $40,659 $7,858 3.4 0.68 
2007 0.33 1.26 1.96 202 286 $42,857 $7,925 4.1 0.87 
2008 0.34 1.60 2.40 204 295 $43,034 $8,199 6.2 1.29 
 
2000–02 
2003–08 
  
2000–08 
 
0.00 
0.27 
 
0.18 
 
0.00 
0.82 
 
0.55 
 
0.00 
1.59 
 
1.36 
 
174 
192 
 
186 
 
254 
274 
 
267 
 
$34,306 
$39,479 
 
$37,755 
 
$6,504 
$8,027 
 
$7,932 
 
4.9 
4.5 
 
4.6 
 
1.11 
1.31 
 
1.26 
          
 
Note:  Median household income is not adjusted for inflation. 
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TABLE 3 
 
Average Entry-Level Salary by Union Status 
 
  
Coastal-Affected Agencies 
 
Agencies with 100+ Sworn 
   
  
Year 
 
Union 
 
 n 
No 
Union 
 
n 
 
t-test 
 
Union 
 
n 
No 
Union 
 
n 
 
t-test 
               
 2003  $29,444   9  $27,030 49  1.577  $30,302   7  $30,911 20 -0.466  
 2004  $30,810 12  $27,584 46  2.201*  $32,586   9  $31,481 19  0.819  
 2005  $32,195 14  $29,120 44  2.294*  $33,806 10  $32,905 18  0.694 
 2006  $34,994 19  $29,785 39  4.305*  $36,230 14  $34,041 14  1.701 
 2007  $36,060 19  $30,699 39  4.108*  $37,490 14  $35,172 14  1.826 
 2008  $36,164 20  $31,175 38  3.845*  $37,785 14  $35,572 14  1.637 
           
 
Note:  Salary is not adjusted for inflation. 
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TABLE 4 
 
Fixed-Effects Panel Data Analysis, Coastal-Affected Agencies (n = 58) 
 
   
# Annual 
   
 Salary  Leave Days Salary Supplement Buy-Back Tuition 
Variable (1) (2)     (1)     (2)         (1)   (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
           
Sworn Size   0.01* 
(0.00) 
 
0.01 
(0.00) 
 
  0.00 
  (0.01) 
 
  0.00 
  (0.01) 
 -0.04 
  (0.02) 
 -0.04 
  (0.03) 
-0.02* 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
0.06 
(0.05) 
0.06 
(0.05) 
Median HH Income -0.03 
 (0.05) 
 
-0.03 
(0.05) 
 
  0.13 
  (0.07) 
  0.13 
  (0.07) 
 
 -0.06 
  (0.13) 
 -0.05 
  (0.14) 
0.10 
(0.10) 
0.09 
(0.10) 
-0.10 
(0.28) 
-0.10 
(0.28) 
Unemployment Rate   -0.27* 
 (0.08) 
 
-0.31* 
(0.08) 
 
  0.19 
  (0.11) 
  0.20 
  (0.11) 
 
 -0.13 
  (0.20) 
 -0.18 
  (0.21) 
0.15 
(0.17) 
0.19 
(0.17) 
-0.85 
(0.52) 
-0.85 
(0.52) 
Union (1 = yes)  0.85* 
 (0.41) 
 
0.31 
(0.43) 
 
  0.26 
  (0.56) 
 0.31 
(0.62) 
 
 -0.86 
  (1.13) 
 -1.68 
  (1.25) 
0.85 
(0.86) 
1.72 
(0.99) 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
Union * Years Unionized — 
— 
 
  0.34* 
(0.11) 
 
— 
— 
  -0.03 
  (0.16) 
— 
— 
     0.61* 
   (0.31) 
— 
— 
 -0.51* 
(0.26) 
 
— 
— 
N/A 
N/A 
Year Trend  1.20* 
 (0.10) 
 
  1.13* 
(0.10) 
 
  -0.17 
  (0.14) 
  -0.16 
  (0.14) 
  0.43 
  (0.26) 
  0.27 
  (0.27) 
0.10 
(0.19) 
0.18 
(0.20) 
0.42 
(0.59) 
0.42 
(0.59) 
 
Number of Observations 
Number of Agencies 
348 
  58 
348 
  58 
348 
  58 
348 
  58 
144 
  24 
144 
  24 
210 
  35 
210 
  35 
42 
  7 
42 
  7 
R2 within 0.73 0.74 0.02 0.02 — — — — — — 
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F-statistic 153.0 133.1 1.36 1.14 — — — — — — 
χ2 — — — —   6.20 10.69 14.29   18.28    8.42   8.42 
Log-likelihood 
 
-573.9 -568.0 -689.3 -689.2 -46.89 -44.65 -73.21  -73.22 -11.37 -11.37 
 
Note:  Annual leave is a linear solution; the others are logistical solutions.  Salary and household income are expressed in thousands of 
dollars and are not adjusted for inflation.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
* denotes significance at the .05 level of analysis. 
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TABLE 5 
 
Fixed-Effects Panel Data Analysis, Agencies with 100+ Sworn (n = 28) 
 
   
# Annual 
   
 Salary Leave Days Salary Supplement Buy-Back Tuition 
Variable (1) (2)     (1)     (2)         (1)   (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
           
Sworn Size   0.01 
(0.00) 
 
 0.01 
(0.00) 
 
  -0.00 
  (0.01) 
 
  -0.00 
  (0.01) 
  -0.14* 
  (0.06) 
  -0.13* 
  (0.06) 
-0.03* 
(0.01) 
-0.03 
(0.01) 
0.05 
(0.06) 
0.05 
(0.06) 
Median HH Income 0.08 
 (0.07) 
 
0.09 
(0.07) 
 
   0.34* 
  (0.16) 
   0.34* 
  (0.16) 
 
  0.15 
  (0.37) 
  0.33 
  (0.42) 
0.25 
(0.26) 
0.13 
(0.40) 
-0.07 
(0.28) 
-0.07 
(0.28) 
Unemployment Rate   -0.24* 
 (0.10) 
 
-0.27* 
(0.09) 
 
   0.41 
  (0.21) 
   0.40 
  (0.21) 
 
  -0.84 
  (0.54) 
  -0.73 
  (0.52) 
0.18 
(0.28) 
0.25 
(0.34) 
-0.62 
(0.60) 
-0.62 
(0.60) 
Union (1 = yes)  -0.47 
 (0.46) 
 
-0.94* 
(0.46) 
 
   0.62 
  (1.00) 
  0.49 
(1.05) 
 
  -2.61 
  (3.07) 
-3.16 
  (2.97) 
0.98 
(1.24) 
3.74 
(2.22) 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
Union * Years Unionized — 
— 
 
0.41* 
(0.12) 
 
— 
— 
  0.11 
  (0.28) 
— 
— 
   0.85 
   (0.97) 
— 
— 
-1.97* 
(0.64) 
 
— 
— 
N/A 
N/A 
Year Trend  1.16* 
 (0.16) 
 
0.99* 
(0.16) 
 
  -0.67 
  (0.35) 
  -0.71 
  (0.37) 
   1.52 
  (0.88) 
   0.73 
  (1.16) 
0.00 
(0.49) 
0.97 
(0.78) 
0.40 
(0.69) 
0.40 
(0.69) 
 
Number of Observations 
Number of Agencies 
167 
  28 
167 
  28 
167 
  28 
167 
  28 
65 
11 
65 
11 
78 
13 
78 
13 
23 
  4 
23 
  4 
R2 within 0.81 0.82 0.05 0.05 — — — — — — 
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F-statistic 112.4 102.9 1.30 1.10 — — — — — — 
χ2 — — — —   22.55 23.62 12.04 28.78   5.50   5.50 
Log-likelihood 
 
-252.2 -245.3 -383.3 -383.1 -11.06 -10.53 -23.98    -15.60 -6.76 -6.76 
 
Note:  Annual leave is a linear solution; the others are logistical solutions.  Salary and household income are expressed in thousands of 
dollars and are not adjusted for inflation.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
* denotes significance at the .05 level of analysis. 
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